|Joel||Williams||1100 Eck Hall of Law||574.631.6627||574.631.4197||Joel.V.Williams.firstname.lastname@example.org|| ||Joel Williams joined the Notre Dame Law School as an assistant adjunct faculty member in 2000. In 2000 and 2001, Joel taught a Prosecutor’s Externship class. Since 2005, Joel has been co-teaching the Moot Court Trial class, and co-coaching the Barristers and AAJ Trial Teams.
Joel graduated from the University of Michigan in 1992 with a B.A. in Political Science. In 1993, Joel began law school at the University of Toledo Law School. In his second year of law school, Joel was a member of the University of Toledo Law Review and had his Comment, “Sibling Rights to Visitation: A Relationship Too Valuable to Be Denied” published. During his third year of law school, Joel was the Symposium Editor of the Law Review. In 1996, Joel graduated tenth (10th) in his class and was granted membership in The Order of the Coif.
After graduating law school, Joel worked as a Deputy County Attorney in Maricopa County, Arizona, prosecuting vehicular crimes. From 1999 to 2003, Joel worked as a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in St. Joseph County, Indiana prosecuting vehicular crimes and murder cases. Since 2003, Joel has been a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in Elkhart County, Indiana. Currently, he is the Supervisor of the Major Crimes Division and is Supervisor of the Elkhart County Fatal Alcohol Crash Team. In addition, Joel currently prosecutes murder, attempted murder and vehicular homicide cases. Finally, he is in charge of the Office’s training program.
In addition to teaching at Notre Dame Law School, Joel has also served as an Assistant Adjunct Professor at Ivy Tech State College. Joel has served as a faculty member for the National District Attorney’s Association (NDAA) and the Indiana Prosecuting Attorney’s Council (IPAC) in their Trial Advocacy Programs. Finally, Joel has given lectures at numerous IPAC seminars on various criminal law and trial advocacy topics.|| ||LAW75747, Moot Court Trial||Adjunct Faculty|
|John||Finnis||M.||2117 Eck Hall of Law||574.631.5989||574.631.4197||John.M.Finnis.email@example.com||http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=431242||http://www.nd.edu/~ndlaw/faculty/cv/finnis_cv.pdf|
- British Commonwealth Constitutional Law
- Shakespeare: Law & Politics
|Known for his work in moral, political and legal theory, as well as constitutional law, John joined the Notre Dame Law School faculty in 1995. He earned his LL.B. from Adelaide University (Australia) in 1961 and his doctorate from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar in 1965. At The University of Oxford he held the positions of lecturer, reader and a chaired professor in law for over four decades until 2010. In addition, he served as associate in law at the University of California at Berkeley (1965-66), as professor of law at the University of Malawi (Africa) (1976-78), and as the Huber Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the Boston College Law School (1993-94). He is admitted to the English Bar (Gray’s Inn).
Professor Finnis teaches courses in Jurisprudence, in the Social, Political and Legal Theory of Thomas Aquinas and in the Social, Political and Legal Theory of Shakespeare.
His service has included the Linacre [now the Anscombe] Centre for Health Care Ethics (governor since 1981), the Catholic Bishops’ Joint Committee on Bioethical Issues (1981-88), the International Theological Commission (1986-92), the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (1990-95), and the Pontifical Academy Pro Vita (2001-present). He has published widely in law, legal theory, moral and political philosophy, moral theology, and the history of the late Elizabethan era. He is an adjunct Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Notre Dame.|| ||/assets/71638/original/finnis.jpg||LAW73807, Social, Political and Legal Thought of Shakespeare
LAW73809, Social, Political and Legal Thought of Thomas Aquinas
London program: Jurisprudence||<b>Recent publications include:</b>
<i><a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101522 Extreme Speech and Democracy">Endorsing Discrimination between Faiths: A Case of Extreme Speech?</a></i> (forthcoming)
<i><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392217">Review Essay: [Anscombeâs Essays]</a></i>, National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9 (2009) 199-207.
<i><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392288">Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good</a></i>, The Monist 91 (2008) 396-414.
<i><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392283">Reason, Revelation, Universality and Particularity in Ethics</a></i>, American Journal of Jurisprudence 53 (2008) 23-48
<i><a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094691">Grounds of Law and Legal Theory: A Response,</a></i> 13 Legal Theory (2008) 315-344.
<i><a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1100170">On Hart's Ways: Law as Reason and as Fact,</a></i> 52 American Journal of Jurisprudence 25-53 (2007).
<i><a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101495">Nationality, Alienage and Constitutional Principle,</a></i> 123 Law Quarterly Review (July 2007) 417-445.
<i>On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism</i> Notre Dame Law Review 75 (2000) 1597-1611.
<i>Natural Law: The Classical Tradition</i>, in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, March 2002), 1-60.
<i>Aquinas on jus and Hart on Rights: A Response</i>, Review of Politics 64 (2002) 407-10
<i>Law and What I Truly Should Decide</i>, American Journal of Jurisprudence 48 (2003)
<i>Helping Enact Unjust Laws without Complicity in Injustice</i>, American Journal of Jurisprudence 49 (2004) 11-42
<i>"The Thing I am": Personal Identity in Aquinas and Shakespeare</i>, Social Philosophy & Policy 22 (2005) 250-282; also in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred. D. Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Personal Identity (Cambridge & New York, Cambridge U.P, 2005), 250-282.
"Retribution: Punishment's Formative Aim" The American Journal of Jurisprudence 44 (2000) 91-103.
"Shakespeare's Intercession for Love's Martyr", Times Literary Supplement, no. 5220, April 18, 2003, 12-14
NATURAL LAW & NATURAL RIGHTS (Oxford, 2d ed. 2011).
REASON IN ACTION: COLLECTED ESSAYS, VOL. I (Oxford University Press 2011).
INTENTION & IDENTITY: COLLECTED ESSAYS, VOL. II (Oxford University Press 2011).
HUMAN RIGHTS & COMMON GOOD: COLLECTED ESSAYS, Vol. III (Oxford University Press 2011).
Philosophy of Law: COLLECTED ESSAYS, VOL. IV (Oxford University Press 2011).
RELIGION & PUBLIC REASONS: COLLECTED ESSAYS, Vol. V (Oxford University Press 2011).
Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press 1998).
Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision and Truth (Catholic University of America Press 1991).
Ed., Natural Law, 2 vols. (New York University Press 1991).
Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism, with J. M. Boyle Jr. and G. Grisez (Oxford University Press 1987).
Fundamentals of Ethics (Georgetown University Press and Oxford University Press 1983).
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press 1980; 9th impression. 1997).
<i>Telling the Truth about God and Man in a Pluralist Society: Economy or Explication?</i> in Christopher Wolfe (ed.), The Naked Public Square Reconsidered: Religion and Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2009), 103-115 & 195-200.
<i>Discriminating between Faiths: A Case of Extreme Speech?</i>, in Hare and McNeil (eds.), Extreme Speech and Democracy: (Oxford University Press 2009) 430-441.
John Finnis, <i>Restricting Legalised Abortion is Not Intrinsically Unjust</i>, in COOPERATION, COMPLICITY AND CONSCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN HEALTHCARE, SCIENCE, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 232 (Helen Watt ed., 2005).
John Finnis, <i>A Vote Decisive for... a More Restrictive Law</i>, in COOPERATION, COMPLICITY AND CONSCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN HEALTHCARE, SCIENCE, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 269 (Helen Watt ed., 2005).
<i>Intention in Tort Law</i>, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 229 (David Owen ed., Oxford 1995).
<i>Natural Law and Legal Reasoning</i>, in Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays 134 (Robert P. George ed., Clarendon 1992).
<i>Intention and Side-Effects</i>, in Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals 32 (R. Frey and C. Morris eds., Cambridge University Press 1991).
<i>Commonwealth and Dependencies</i>, in 6 Halsbury's Laws of England 315 (Butterworth 4th ed. 1974 and annual supplements); complete revision in 6 Halsbury's Laws of England 345 (1991).
<i>Revolutions and Continuity of Law</i>, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Second Series 44 (Simpson ed., Oxford 1971).
<i>Allocating Risks and Suffering: Some Hidden Traps</i>, 38 Cleveland State Law Review 193 (1990).
<i>Legal Enforcement of "Duties to Oneself": Kant v. Neo-Kantians</i>, 87 Columbia Law Review 433 (1987).
<i>On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire</i>, 6 Law & Philosophy 357 (1987).
<i>On "The Critical Legal Studies Movement,"</i> 30 American Journal of Jurisprudence 21 (1985); also in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Third Series 145 (Bell and Eekelaar eds., Oxford 1987).
<i>The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory</i>, 1 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 115 (1984).
<i>Reason and Passion: The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity</i>, 116 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 222 (1967).||<a href="http://ministryvalues.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1027&Itemid=127">In Defense of Professor Kenneth Howell</a>, ministryValues.com (Quotes: John Finnis) July 16, 2010||Biolchini Family Professor of Law||<a href="mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org">Tracy Zielke</a>|